The Social Animal
Elliot Aronson's textbook of social psychology, written for general readers rather than for students — a survey of how people are shaped by the presence and expectations of others, by one of the field's major experimentalists.
- First published
- 1972
- Publisher
- Worth Publishers/W.H. Freeman
- Pages
- 431
- Shelf
- Mind
- Level
- Deep
- ISBN-13
- 9780716733126
Record checked against
Catalogue note
- Reads as
- ReferenceBuilt to be consulted rather than read straight through.
- Level
- Advanced / AdvancedAssumes you have read around the subject already.
- Approach
- Practical
- Written for
- Curious general readers, Specialists and serious readers
- Ideas
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Read this if
- You want evidence about why people behave as they do, not folklore.
- You want something to keep nearby and return to, rather than read once.
- You have read around this already and want a book that assumes it.
What kind of book this is
A textbook in substance and an essay in style. Aronson conducted much of the research he describes, and writes with the authority and the opinions of a participant rather than a summariser.
It has been revised across many editions since 1972, which means the underlying research has been updated repeatedly while the organising arguments have stayed largely constant.
A textbook written by someone who ran many of the experiments in it, and who has opinions about all of them.
Devmark’s reading — not a quotation from the book
Conformity
His treatment of the classic work — Asch's line judgements, Sherif's autokinetic studies — distinguishes compliance, identification and internalisation as different depths of social influence.
The distinction matters practically: behaviour that changes through compliance reverts when surveillance ends, while internalised change persists. Most attempts to change behaviour aim at the shallowest level.
Cognitive dissonance
Aronson's own research area and the book's intellectual centre. The discomfort of holding inconsistent cognitions drives people to change one of them — and the one that changes is usually the belief rather than the behaviour.
His refinement of Festinger's theory — that dissonance is strongest when the inconsistency threatens the self-concept — is his substantive contribution, and it explains why the effect is so powerful around questions of competence and morality.
Effort justification and the initiation finding
His best-known experiment: participants who underwent an unpleasant procedure to join a group subsequently rated the group more favourably than those admitted easily.
The mechanism is dissonance reduction — the effort must have been for something — and it explains hazing, demanding professional training, and a great deal of institutional loyalty.
Persuasion and the communicator
His survey of what actually changes attitudes: source credibility, apparent disinterest, two-sided arguments for informed audiences, fear appeals paired with specific actionable instructions.
The fear finding is the most practically useful — fear without a concrete achievable action produces avoidance rather than behaviour change, which is why many public health campaigns fail.
Fear without a specific achievable action produces avoidance, not behaviour change.
Devmark’s reading — not a quotation from the book
Aggression
His treatment reviews frustration-aggression, social learning, and the evidence on media violence, and is careful about the difference between laboratory aggression and real violence.
His most useful observation concerns catharsis: the intuitive idea that expressing aggression discharges it is not supported, and the evidence mostly runs the other way.
Prejudice and the jigsaw classroom
His applied work, and the section with the clearest practical legacy. After desegregation, simple contact between groups did not reliably reduce prejudice; contact under conditions of mutual interdependence did.
The jigsaw classroom structures learning so that each student holds information the others need, making cooperation necessary. The approach has been replicated widely and is the book's most concrete contribution to practice.
Self-justification
The theme running through the book: people work continuously to see themselves as reasonable and decent, and will adjust their beliefs substantially to preserve that view.
Aronson develops this at length in his later book with Carol Tavris, and it is the idea from this volume most worth carrying — that the sincere explanation someone gives for their behaviour is frequently a reconstruction in service of self-regard.
Where the field has moved
Several classic studies described here have been complicated by later scrutiny — Milgram's obedience work has documented methodological problems, the Stanford prison study has been seriously challenged, and parts of the social psychology literature were affected by the replication crisis.
Recent editions address some of this. A reader using an older edition should be aware that a handful of the most famous studies are in a different position now than when the book first described them.
Who it is for
A genuinely good general introduction to how people behave around other people, written by someone with authority and a clear prose style.
Its length and textbook structure make it a commitment. Read selectively — dissonance, persuasion, prejudice — rather than cover to cover, and prefer a recent edition for the updated treatment of the contested classics.
What to take away
- 01Compliance reverts, internalisation persistsMost behaviour-change efforts aim at the shallowest level of influence and are surprised when it does not hold.
- 02Dissonance changes the belief, not the actAnd it is strongest where the inconsistency threatens the self-concept.
- 03Effort makes the outcome valuableWhich explains hazing, demanding training programmes, and a great deal of institutional loyalty.
- 04Fear needs an action attachedWithout a specific achievable step, fear appeals produce avoidance rather than change.
- 05Contact needs interdependenceMere proximity between groups does not reduce prejudice; needing each other to succeed does.
